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Abstract
Formal specification and verification of protocols have
been credited for uncovering protocol flaws; revealing
inadequacies in protocol design of the Initial Stage
and Negotiation Stage; and proved that improved
protocol performs in the desired manner while un-
der modelled attacks from dishonest players. It also
shows how formal methods can be used by protocol
designer to achieve a better design of a complex sys-
tem. Formal methods can also populate an abstract
concept with a more complete and consistent protocol
specification. Complex system protocol can be easily
specified with simplifying assumptions for a high level
of protocol verification. This set of assumptions can
then be used to further explore the protocol. Using
formal methods for complex secure system protocol
design will provide not only better quality protocol
but could also be the first step in advancing an ab-
stract concept to a more practical stage for develop-
ment.
Keywords: secure e-contract, e-commerce security, e-
tendering
1 Introduction
A legally binding contract is the product of an e-
tendering process. The e-tendering process consists of
a principal who releases a public invitation for tender-
ers to make offers or tender submissions to the princi-
pal before a specified closing time. Before the closing
time, tenderers can communicate with the principal
requesting clarification or verification of the tender
specification. After the closing time, the tender sub-
missions are opened and non-conforming tenders are
rejected. The principal then performs tender eval-
uation during which time the principal can ask the
tenderer to clarify their submission. Eventually the
principal selects the winner of the tender and a legal
contract may be formed. A valid contract resulting
from the tendering process must contain three ele-
ments: the invitation to offer, the tender offer and
the tender acceptance.
All communication between the principal and the
tenderers must be retained as contractual evidence.
If a dispute occurs, the contractual evidence is the
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only protection for the parties involved. In the case
of an electronic contract the contents of the contract
evidence may be easily manipulated by a malicous
party when compared to a paper based system. The
advantages of an electronic contract system such as
cost effectiveness and efficiency outweigh this disad-
vantage. There is a need for electronic contracting
systems to ensure that the final archived contract con-
tains a complete and uncorrupted set of evidence.
Du, Foo, Boyd, and Fitzgerald (2004) have de-
veloped a protocol to preserve e-tendering communi-
cation integrity and to protect contractual evidence
(will be called DFBF protocol through the paper).
However, only an heuristic security analysis was pre-
sented, which left uncertainty in the protocol security
specification. For complex secure protocol, it is very
important that formal analysis is performed to pro-
vide creditable evidence of protocol security proper-
ties.
This paper will conduct a formal analysis of the
DFBF protocol. Using formal methods for pro-
tocol security analysis has proved to be successful
(Meadows, 2000, 2003). Particularly, the verifica-
tion of fair exchange (Boyd & Kearney, 2000) and
non-repudiation (Gu˝rgens & Rudolph, 2002) proto-
cols have explored dishonest player’s malicious behav-
iour.
Gurgens, Ochsenschla˝ger, and Rudolph (2002);
Gu˝rgens and Rudolph (2002) have successfully used
Asynchronous product automata (APA) formal spec-
ification with Simple Homomorphic Verification Tool
(SHVT) (Ochsenschla˝ger, Repp, Rieke, & Nitsche,
1999) to analyse fair exchange protocols. However,
their strategies cannot be directly employed in our
analysis of DFBF contract evidence protocols as the
security goals of this protocol are different. DFBF
protocol is also larger and more complex.
This paper has two main contributions. The first
is to show that formal analysis can be used as part of
the design process for secure protocols. The second
contribution is that we give an example of how to
use formal analysis on a large complex e-commerce
protocol. As a result of our formal analysis we identify
several security flaws in the protocol and present a
modified protocol which solves these problems.
The paper is structured in the following way. The
next section describes the original DFBF contracting
evidence protocol. Then we discuss the the formal
methods and procedures used to develop the formal
specification of the protocol. Next we discuss the re-
sults of the formal specification and identify security
flaws within the existing protocol and present a mod-
ified secure protocol.
2 The DFBF Contractual Evidence Protocol
During the e-tendering process messages can be sent
between the principal and the tenderers before and
after the closing time. The aim of DFBF protocol
is to ensure that the integrity of these messages is
retained for the entire e-tendering process. The pro-
tocol preserves sequentially generated electronic con-
tractual evidence integrity effectively by using a dig-
itally signed hash chain.
2.1 Protocol Security Requirements
The contracting process in e-tendering is vulnerable
to external attackers as well as internal attackers,
such as dishonest players either the principal or ten-
derers who may alter contract evidence to gain finan-
cial benefit. The protocol needs to provide the fol-
lowing security services: Confidentiality, Data Origin
Authentication, Original Integrity Confirmation, and
System Reliability.
Confidentiality service ensures that only the e-
contracting parties are privy to the information re-
lated to the contract negotiation. Providing a confi-
dentiality service is a general requirement throughout
the whole tendering practice. It prevents unautho-
rized release of the tenderer’s tender strategy, design
and other private information. This property elim-
inates any opportunity for an eavesdropper to gain
access to any confidential information communicated
between contracting parties.
Data origin authentication service ensures that
the party receiving a message can confirm the identity
of the party originating the message in a contracting
process. This property also implicitly provides an as-
surance of message integrity (Menezes, van Oorschot,
& Vanstone, 1997). The data origin authentication
ensures that the e-contracting evidence (the proof of
a valid and binding contract) is trustworthy when it
is first generated. It involves binding the message
originating party to the message to prevent repudia-
tion, message replay, and impersonation attacks. It
also provides confirmation of the message’s original
integrity.
Original integrity confirmation service is to
ensure that the original integrity of information re-
lated to a contract is effectively preserved and this
integrity is verifiable at any given time. Preserving
the original integrity is the fundamental evidentiary
requirement for electronic contract evidence.
System Reliability protects against protocol
disruption. There are two types of disruptions in
the contracting process (1) normal termination (ter-
minate negotiation) from one party; (2) abnormal be-
havior from either one or both parties. This property
ensures that normal disputes can be easily resolved
and that one party cannot use the protocol algorithm
to gain advantage over the other party.
2.2 Protocol Overview
There are three players in the protocol: The principal,
tenderers, and the trusted third party (TTP). The
protocol contains six sub-protocols that can be sep-
arated into two groups, main contracting group and
protocol protection group. A full formal specification
for all protocol suit would lead to state explosion dur-
ing analyse.
We will only concentrate on the main contracting
group and the termination sub-protocol from proto-
col protection group to reduce the size of specifica-
tion. Further formal specification can be done after
the main group of protocols are proved to work cor-
rectly.
The main group protocol consists of three sub-
protocols: The initial sub-protocol, the negotiation
sub-protocol and the final stage sub-protocol. This
group of protocols enable contracting parties to com-
municate their invitation to offer, tender offer and
acceptance in a secure way.
During the e-tendering process, the principal will
start the initial sub-protocol. The principal and
the tenderers will continue communicating using the
negotiation sub-protocol. When the final contract
is formed, the principal and the selected winning
tenderer will enter the final stage sub-protocol to
complete their e-tendering communication with the
trusted third party as witness.
The parties can also formally terminate the com-
munication with the termination sub-protocol by in-
volving the trusted third party TTP . The termi-
nation sub-protocol can be initiated through any of
the other sub-protocols except the final stage sub-
protocol when the contracting parties cease negotia-
tions.
All the notations used in this paper are listed in
Figure 1.
We have formally specified the main group of sub-
protocols, and termination sub-protocol. In the fol-
lowing sections, we only present the sub-protocols for
which formal specifications have been written and
analysis have been performed. It includes Initial
Stage, Negotiation Stage, Final Stage, and Termina-
tion sub-protocols.
Initial Sub-Protocol The player A represents the
principal who always starts the initial sub-protocol.
A is responsible for generating the starting node of
the hash chain. A will use this protocol to send its
invitation to offer and project specification to all ten-
derers.
A B
L0 = h(TD)
σA = SigPrivA (L0)
M0 = EPubB (TD‖σA)‖CA
M0−→
Figure 2: Initial Stage Sub-Protocol
The principal uses TD as the input of h hash func-
tion to generate L0. It then uses its private key PrivA
and signature function Sig to produce its signature
σA over the root node L0. The principal also encrypts
the (TD‖σA) using the public key PubB and concate-
nates the CA of a tenderer to produce M0 which can
be sent confidentially to a tenderer over an insecure
network.
Negotiation Sub-Protocol The Negotiation
Stage responsible for generating a reliable hash chain
for all messages communicated between the principal
and the tenderers to preserve integrity of contractual
evidence.
Both A or B can be the initial sender of a message
in the protocol. For example, the tenderer B can send
SYMBOL NAME
−→ One party sends another party a message eg. B −→ A, B send A
‖ Concatenation
PrivID Private key of party ID eg. PrivB , B’s private key
PubID Public key of party ID
CID Certificate of party ID
h Secure hash function
Sig Signature generation function
V Signature verifying function
Ex Asymmetrical encryption function, x represents input key
Dx Asymmetrical decryption function, x represents input key
mn nth communicated message of a contract negotiation
TD Tender Document by principal
HCID One party’s entire hash chain or TTP roll backed hash chain
DS Start of dispute
TM Start of termination
RTM Respond of the termination
mf Final contract signed by both parties
mcf Confirmation message generated by TTP
mer Error message generated by TTP
Figure 1: Notation
its tender offer or A can send its update of tender
specification.
Figure 3 shows that B is the sender in this com-
munication round. Sender B concatenates mn‖Ln−1
as the input of h to generate the nth node Ln. B then
signs the node with its private key PrivB to produce
its signature σnB over Ln. In this way, B binds its
commitment to the message.
B encrypts mn‖σnB with A’s public key PubA,
concatenates CB and sends the encrypted message
Mn to A.
On receiving messageMn, A decrypts messageMn
with its private key PrivA, checks B’s certificate CB .
A calculates the nth node Ln itself by concatenating
mn and the previous node Ln−1 as the input of the
secure hash function h. At this stage A can verify
whether VPubB (σnB , Ln) = 1 to confirm the messages
integrity. If it is true, A will sign the Ln and send
RSP to B. If it is not true, A will not send RSP .
This will trigger B to re-send Mn to A. Both parties
also have the option to start the protocol disruption
protection sub-protocol.
A B
Ln = h(mn‖Ln−1)
σnB = SigPrivB (Ln)
Mn = EPubA (mn‖σnB)‖CB
Mn←−
(mn‖σnB) = DPrivA (Mn)
Ln = h(mn‖Ln−1)
if VPubB (σnB , Ln) = 1
σnA = SigPrivA (Ln)
RSPn = EPubB (σnA)‖CA
RSPn−→
if VPubB (σnB , Ln) 6= 1
do not send RSP triggerMn
resend
Figure 3: Negotiation Stage Sub-Protocol
Final Stage Sub-Protocol When the final node
Lf is generated after both parties have signed the final
formal contract, they need to send the final node to
the TTP for long term preservation of the contractual
evidence. This stage also confirms that both parties
have agreed on the final contract. The third party is
the witness. This stage’s protocol is listed in Figure
4.
Both parties A and B have to sign the final node
Lf . Signatures σfA and σfB are encrypted with the
trusted third party public key PubTTP . The en-
crypted messages MfA and MfB are sent to TTP
by the respective parties.
On receiving the messages A and B, TTP decrypts
the message with its private key PrivTTP , extracts
the parties signature, each party’s final hash chain
node (LfA, LfB), and identifies the corresponding
party’s ID. If both parties’ LfA and LfB are equal,
the TTP will send confirmation and archive the last
node for the contracting parties. If the results are
not equal, TTP will sign the concatenation of σfA,
σfB and the error messagemer. Encrypted error mes-
sages MfTTPA MfTTPB will be sent to party A and
B correspondingly.
Termination Sub-Protocol The termination
sub-protocol (Figure 5) requires TTP passing and
witnessing the parties’ termination process. The
termination sub-protocol can be executed from any
stage of the protocol. In Figure 5, B initiates a
termination sub-protocol by sending its signed hash
chain (HCB) to TTP . TTP signs B’s signature
(σdB) and passes the message to A. In response to
B’s termination request, A signs its own hash chain
(HCA) and sends it to TTP for witnessing. TTP
also signs A’s signature and passes the response to
B.
3 Formal Specification of the DFBF Contrac-
tual Evidence Protocol
APA formal specification language is supported by
SHVT (Ochsenschla˝ger et al., 1999). APA models the
collection of automata as protocol players or agents;
and the internal states of each players/agents as a
set of state components. Each atutomata can only
A TTP B
σfA = SigPrivA (LfA) σfB = SigPrivB (LfB)
MfA = EPubTTP (σfA‖B‖LfA)‖CA MfB = EPubTTP (σfB‖A‖LfB)‖CB
MfA−→ MfB←−
if VPubA (σfA, LfA) = 1
and VPubB (σfB , LfB) = 1
and LfB = LfA
σTTP = SigPrivTTP (σfA‖σfB‖mcf )
MfTTPA = EPubA (σTTP ‖mcf )‖CTTP
MfTTPB = EPubB (σTTP ‖mcf )‖CTTP
MfTTPA←− MfTTPB−→
assume A verifies TTP ’s signature assume B verifies TTP ’s signature
else
σTTP = SigPrivTTP (σfA‖σfB‖mer)
MfTTPA = EPubA (σTTP ‖mer)‖CTTP
MfTTPB = EPubB (σTTP ‖mer)‖CTTP
MfTTPA←− MfTTPB−→
assume A verifies TTP ’s signature assume B verifies TTP ’s signature
*** any party can start dispute sub-protocol ***
Figure 4: Final Stage Sub-Protocol
A TTP B
LdB = (HCB‖TM‖B‖A)
σdB = SigPrivB (LdB)
MdB = EPubTTP (LdB‖σdB)‖CB
MdB←−
σdTTP = SigPrivTTP (σdB)
MdTTPA = EPubA (σdB‖σdTTP )‖CB‖CTTP
MdTTPA←−
LdA = (HCA‖RTM‖B‖A)
σdA = SigPrivA (LdA)
MdA = EPubTTP (LdA‖σdA)‖CA
MdA−→
σdTTP = SigPrivTTP (σdA)
MdTTPB = EPubB (σdA‖σdTTP )‖CA‖CTTP
MdTTPB−→
*** assume all receivers verify originator’s signatures ***
Figure 5: Termination Sub-Protocol
access the state components which has a link to it.
A protocol or a system specified with APA requires
the allocation of roles of each automata, their initial
state of state components, and the transition relations
(state transition or actions). The specification is then
analyzed using the SHVT which explores all possible
states. Each automata can only alter the state com-
ponents connected to it by adding or removing state
elements through specified transition relations.
This section describes how a formal specification is
constructed while designing the protocol in its early
stages. The specification must be complete, consis-
tent, and unambiguous to find protocol flaws in the
protocol design stage. The verification should prove
that security functions work together in a desired
manner under our defined limitation of malicious ac-
tions. The following steps must be taken in order:
(1)define protocol assumptions for the formal specifi-
cation; (2)define security goals; (3)specify initial state
sets and transition relations; (4)conduct analysis of
the specified protocol.
Simplifying assumptions (Boyd & Kearney, 2000)
must be made before a formal specification. A first
round high abstract specification should also be used
to refine the assumptions set. This approach provides
benefits to the protocol design process in that there is
a clear understanding the protocol running environ-
ment and contracting process, and that the honest
behaviour for each player is defined.
Assumptions can be varied to simulate malicious
actions. The variable assumptions in the formal spec-
ification can then act as the guidelines for defining at-
tack models. For example, some of the assumptions
can be relaxed to give more power to dishonest play-
ers, such as the ability to insert malicious actions.
Three independent analysis have been performed
for the e-contracting protocol. Player A has the role
of the principal and Player B takes the role of ten-
derer.
The first analysis assumes that all players are hon-
est at all times. A minimal set of assumptions can be
found when the protocol works in a desired way.
The second analysis assumes that B is dishonest
at tender offering step but A is honest. It tries to
send two offers to A hoping to swap the message at a
later stage.
The third analysis assumes that A is dishonest in
the tender offer step but B is honest during the pro-
tocol run. A’s attempt is to find out whether any
message signed by B in the main protocol can be
substituted for other sub-protocol.
3.1 Define Assumptions for Specification
Assumptions place limitations on a player’s dishonest
behaviour. Simplifying assumptions should be consis-
tent with business rules. Some are reliable assump-
tions which must be true for the protocol. These
reliable assumptions can not be varied during pro-
tocol modelling. Others are temporal assumptions
which are indeterministic and their existence is ran-
dom. These assumptions can be varied or omitted
during specification to facilitate exploration of inse-
cure states.
Reliable Assumptions The following reliable as-
sumptions either define the protocol run conditions
that must be met, or state unchangeable truths of a
player’s behaviour.
• TTP is always honest and can always be trusted.
This is the condition that must be true. Both
contracting players know that the TTP can be
trusted. Although in reality, a fully trusted TTP
may not exist, but in a relative sense the TTP is
more trust-worthy than a contract partner.
• The assumptions derived from secure crypto-
graphic functions are reliable assumptions. This
set of assumptions include:
– encryptions are perfect, keys can not be
guessed;
– if EPub(m) = EPub′(m′), it implies Pub =
Pub′ and m = m′;
– if h(m) = h(m′), it implies m = m′, for h is
a secure hash function;
– if SigPriv(h(m)) = SigPriv′(h(m)′), it im-
plies h(m) = h(m)′, and Priv = Priv′;
• At this level of protocol analysis, we have to as-
sume that these secure cryptographic functions
exist and are provably secure.
• We assume that computer and network security
are provided. Cryptographic functions rely on
secure computer platforms to provide a security
service. If these functions are secure, these as-
sumptions have to be true. This paper only fo-
cuses on dishonest player specifications, therefore
network security is assumed.
• No parties will consciously sign anything that
they do not agree upon. Players will ensure that
communicated messages for contracting are in
the following order: invitation to offer (project
specification), tender offer, and acceptance. Mes-
sage content flag (can be inserted into the mod-
elling code) can be used to assure that each mini
cycle will be executed in the correct sequence.
• Players only explore behaviour that will benefit
themselves. No party will release its private key
to another party.
• Both A and B have power to insert malicious
actions at any stage of the protocol transition
state. This is the condition that should be true
during protocol specification for modelling dis-
honest players.
Temporal Assumptions We consider the follow-
ing set of assumptions to be unreliable. Some of them
can be true or false depending on whether or not a
player is honest. They can also be indeterministic
such as the stage in which a malicious behaviour will
be inserted is unknown.
• We do not know where or when a player will in-
ject a malicious action. For example A can ini-
tiate the termination sub-protocol with TTP at
the start of the protocol or during a later stage of
the protocol run, while it still conducts a negoti-
ation sub-protocol run with B. Multiple choices
can be made during protocol specification.
• We also don’t know which party is going to be
dishonest. There are four choices A is honest but
B is dishonest; B is honest but A is dishonest;
both A and B are honest; or both A and B are
dishonest.
• The following assumptions will be true if players
are honest. Only A (principal) should distrib-
ute specification; No other party should start the
protocol and generate the initial node of the hash
chain. Only B ∈ B (potential tenderers) should
send an offer; This is the rule of the business
process. One tenderer B should only submit one
tender once to A. Only principal A should send
the tender acceptance. Only one acceptance can
be sent by principal, and this acceptance should
be only sent to one tenderer.
• No party should engage multiple sub-protocols
for malicious purpose.
3.2 Derive Protocol Security Goals
The main function of the contractual evidence pro-
tocol is to collect reliable evidence to prove that the
principal and tenderer have committed to a business
deal. After a successful negotiation, parties must
agree on a same set of issues and express the intention
to enter a legal binding contract. The protocol must
make sure that reliable evidence is generated and that
this evidence can be verified at a later date.
The protocol uses asymmetrical encryption, secure
hash functions and digital signatures to prevent a dis-
honest participant from gaining benefit by altering
contractual evidence.
During the e-tendering process, a hash chain is
generated from each message sent. It acts as the
checksum for verifying integrity of contractual evi-
dence at a later time. Therefore the protection of the
hash chain integrity is a primary goal for the protocol
design. During the e-tendering contracting period, a
digital signature is applied over each chain node and
corresponding message to protect hash chain integrity
as well as provide the evidence that a player commit-
ted to the message.
At the conclusion of the contracting process, a
trusted third party is introduced to digitally sign and
preserve the last node of the hash chain. To final-
ize and terminate the e-tendering process, all con-
tracting parties and the TTP need to be involved in
digitally signing the termination messages. No con-
tracting party can successfully finalize or terminate
the e-tendering process unilaterally with the trusted
third party without the other party being notified.
The formal specification and analysis must provide
evidence that at the end of each successful protocol
run, both parties hold identical verifying elements for
checking contractual evidence integrity.
Required Verifying Elements The verifying pro-
cedure requires the following sets of elements (com-
municated messages, checksum, and confirmations
) to be generated, verified and stored by the e-
contracting protocol. Elements required for verifying
the integrity of contracting evidence are:
• a set of finite, sequenced and communicated mes-
sages M with f number of elements; These mes-
sages record all the information related to con-
tracting offer, acceptance, and negotiation of
agreement.
• a set of hash chain nodes L formed by each Ln =
h(Ln−1,mn), for mn ∈M and n = 1, 2, ..., f , h()
is the underlying secure hash function;
• a set of signatures SigO over each Ln ∈ L for n =
1, 2, ..., f when the hash chain node is generated
by the sender;
• a set of signatures SigR over each Ln ∈ L for n =
1, 2, ..., f when the hash chain node is verified by
the receiver.
• a set of signatures SigTTP over last hash chain
node Lf ∈ L
Verification Process The verifying process can be
represented as following:
• A and B each provide their set of {M , L, SigO,
SigR and SigTTP}.
• verify that each mn ∈M can hash back into the
hash chain by calculating Ln = h(Ln−1,mn), for
n = 1, 2, ..., f , for both A and B provided sets of
information;
• verify VPubTTP (SigTTP,Lf ) = 1 for both play-
ers’ supplied last node Lf ;
• if necessary, further verification
on each SigO SigR to determine
whether VPubO (SigOn, Ln, ) = 1 and
VPubR(SigRn, Ln) = 1 for n = 1, 2, ..., f ,
PubO is the message originator’s public key and
PubR the message receiver’s public key.
Security Goals The integrity of contractual evi-
dence needs to be verified when a dispute occurs. The
contractual evidence integrity protocol is responsible
for generating reliable checksum elements for verify-
ing the integrity of contractual evidence. The veri-
fying process determines what verifying elements the
protocol should produce. We will define the protocol
security goal as the following terms.
Under predefined assumptions, and after each suc-
cessful protocol run, the protocol should ensure:
1. that it generates a complete set of elements
for verifying the contractual evidence integrity
, {M,L, SigO, SigR, SigTTP};
2. that both A and B possess identical sets of ele-
ments,
A {M,L, SigO, SigR, SigTTP} ≡
B {M,L, SigO, SigR, SigTTP}
3. that each element is verified during its generation
process.
If this condition is satisfied, any alteration of the
message after the protocol run should be detected by
the verification procedure. We can assess whether
the protocol can generate the complete set of these
elements. We can also verify whether the protocol
ensures that all players hold identical sets of elements.
The formal method will be used to explore the pos-
sible protocol state that breaches the above stated se-
curity goals. It can also provide evidence to show that
the set of cryptographic functions work together in a
desired manner under a defined set of assumptions.
3.3 Elements generated by the protocol
According to the defined security goals we can assess
whether each protocol produces a complete set of re-
quired verifying elements.
Initial Stage Sub-protocol A obtains m0 ∈ M ,
L0 ∈ L, SigO0 ∈ SigO, and B obtains m0 ∈ M ,
L0 ∈ L, SigO0 ∈ SigO. No SigR element has been
produced. The Initial Stage of sub-protocol is incom-
plete in producing required verifying elements and the
element verifying process.
Negotiation Stage Sub-protocol A obtains
{mn...mf} ∈ M , {Ln...Lf} ∈ L, {SigOn...SigOf} ∈
SigO, {SigRn...SigRf} ∈ SigR. B obtains
{mn...mf} ∈ M , {Ln...Lf} ∈ L, {SigOn...SigOf} ∈
SigO, {SigRn...SigRf} ∈ SigR. The Negotiation
Stage Sub-protocol missed the verifying process for
all SigR elements.
Final Stage Sub-protocol A obtains SigTTPf ∈
SigTTP , and B obtains SigTTPf ∈ SigTTP .
Further exploration of the protocol will be done
by formal specification and verification process with
APA and SHVT tools.
3.4 Specify Initial State Sets
In APA diagram (figure 6), each automaton is
connected to its own 4 state components, State,
Asymkeys, HashChain and THashChain. All au-
tomata share the Network state component.
The state initialization (table 1) defines roles of au-
tomata A (principal), B (tenderer) and TTP (trusted
third party). State components State, HashChain,
and THashChain are assigned Messages seq as
their data type. The state component Asymkeys is
assigned data type of Asymkeys seq. The initial ele-
ments are then assigned to each state component.
For example “A State” (line 4) is a type
of Messages seq and has [TTP,′ server′] and
Define Roles
1 def role A ;
2 def role B ;
3 def role TTP ;
Role A’s State Components
4 A State : Messages seq := [TTP,′ server′].[′start′, B];
5 A Asymkeys : Asymkeys seq := (A,′ priv′,′ Apriv′).(B,′ pub′,′ Bpub′).(TTP,′ pub′,′ TTPpub′);
6 A HashChain : Messages seq :=::;
7 A THashChain : Messages seq :=::;
Role B’s State Components
8 B State : Messages seq := [TTP,′ server′].[′respond′, A];
9 B Asymkeys : Asymkeys seq := (B,′ priv′,′ Bpriv′).(A,′ pub′,′ Apub′).(TTP,′ pub′,′ TTPpub′);
10 B HashChain : Messages seq :=::;
11 B THashChain : Messages seq :=::; e
Role TTP’s State Components
12 TTP State : Messages seq := [A,′ agent′].[B,′ agent′];
13 TTP Asymkeys : Asymkeys seq := (A,′ pub′,′ Apub′).(B,′ pub′,′ Bpub′).(TTP,′ priv′,′ TTPpriv′);
14 TTP HashChain : Messages seq :=::;
15 TTP THashChain : Messages seq :=::;
Global State Components
16 Network : net elem seq :=::;
17 Netmsg : Messages seq :=::;
Table 1: Initial State Sets
A B
TTP
A_THashChain
A_HashChain
A_Asmykeys
A_State
Network
B_THashChain
TTP_State TTP_Asmykeys TTP_HashChain TTP_THashChain
B_State
B_Asmykeys
B_HashChain
Figure 6: APA diagram
[′start′, B] as initial elements. The initial el-
ements means that role A knows TTP is the
server, and can start protocol with role B. The
role A’s “A Asymkeys” (line 5) of Asymkeys seq
type contains initial elements of (A,′ priv′,′Apriv′),
(B,′ pub′,′Bpub′) and (TTP,′ pub′,′ TTPpub′). These
initial elements represent that A knows its own pri-
vate key, B’s public key and TTP ’s public key. Role
A’s “A HashChain” (line 6) and “A THashChain”
(line 7) state components are empty when protocol
first starts.
3.5 Specify Transition Relations
The specification applied to Initiation Stage, Negoti-
ation Stage sub-protocol, Final Stage and Termina-
tion sub-protocol from DFBF e-contracting protocol.
In the real protocol run, the Negotiation Stage sub-
protocol will be executed multiple rounds to complete
the contracting procedure in the e-tendering process.
The multiple cycles of Negotiation Stage sub-protocol
have been modelled to cover stages of contracting
process, offer and acceptance.
During the specification cycle, role A starts the
Initial Stage sub-protocol. In the offer cycle, role B
starts the Negotiation Stage sub-protocol. For the
acceptance cycle, role A starts the Contracting Stage
sub-protocol.
Tables 2 and 3 are examples of specified transition
relation for the protocol. The left hand column of the
tables represents actions of honest layers.
Transition Pattern if All Players are Honest
Left hand side of tables 2 and 3 represent A and B
acting honestly in their exchange of messages for the
tender offer. B sends the offer to A, A verifies the
specification, produces its hash chain node, signs the
node and sends the confirmation back to B.
def trans pattern B offer1 3 (table 2 line 1)
states that this is role B’s transition pattern in the
first step of offer cycle. This is the third step in the
total transition pattern specification. Line 2 of table
2 declares all the variables needed for this transition
pattern.
[M0, L0,′ L n′] << B HashChain, (table 2 line 9)
indicates that B retrieves the previous hash node into
the current variable L n for generating new nodes.
Line 12 ts := [M1, L0], and line 13 L1 := hash(ts),
show that B generated a new hash chain node
for its offer. Line 14 [M1, L1,′ expects CON ′] >>
B HashChain, B marks the new node as uncon-
firmed and adds a new node into B HashChain state
component. Line 15 rB := sign(bpriv, L1), indicates
that B signs its new node with its private key. Line
16 eB := crypt(apub, [M1, rB]), shows that B en-
crypts its offer M1 and signs the hash chain node
with A’s public key. Line 17 (A,B, [eB,′ offer′]) >>
Network, indicates that B adds the message to the
Network state component.
Line 1 def trans pattern A offer2 4 A’s
transition pattern in step 2 of offer cycle.
Line 2 (M,M0,M1, L0, L1, L1c, Ls1, rA, eA,
ts, ts1, ts2, apriv, bpub, rA1, eA1,HCA, ttppub)
A’s variables needed for this step. Line 8
M << Network, A retrieves the message
from Network state component. Line 13
ts1 := crypt(apriv, ts), A decrypts message
with its private key. Line 14 M1 := head(ts1),
A extracts B’s offer message into M1. Line
15 L1 := elem(3, head(tail(ts1))), A extracts
new hash chain node sent by B. Line 17
verify(bpub, ts2) =′ true′, A verifies B’s signa-
ture is true. Line 20 Ls1 := [M1, L0], and line 21
L1c := hash(Ls1), A calculates its own new hash
chain node with B’s offer M1 with its own previous
hash chain node. Line 22 L1 = L1c, A ensures that
both received node and calculated node are the same.
Line 23 [M1, L1,′ L n′] >> A HashChain, A ad-
vances its hash chain Line 24 rA := sign(apriv, L1),
and line 25 eA := crypt(bpub, [rA]), A signs and con-
firms the new node and encrypts the confirmation.
Line 26 (B,A, [eA,′A cfm′]) >> Network, A adds
confirmation to Network state for B.
Transition Pattern of B is Dishonest Only
This is the example code for the case where B is dis-
honest (table 2). B has inserted the following ma-
licious actions into step 1 of the offer cycle. In line
19 ts2 := [M2, L0], and line 20 L2 := hash(ts2), B
uses offer 2 to generate a new node with the previ-
ous node L0. In line 21 [M2, L2,′ expects CON ′] >>
B HashChain, B adds to its hash chain and waits
for confirmation. In line 22 rB2 := sign(bpriv, L2),
and line 23 eB2 := crypt(apub, [M2, rB2]), and line
24 (A,B, [eB2,′ offer′]) >> Network, B signs, en-
crypts and adds to the Network state for A.
Transition Pattern if A is Dishonest Only This
is the example code for the case where A is dishonest
(table 3). Malicious actions have been inserted into
A’s transition pattern in step 2 of offer cycle.
In line 27 HCA := [L0, L1,′ termination′,′AB′],
A starts the termination sub-protocol with TTP
while still maintaining normal communication with
B. In line 28 rA1 := sign(apriv,HCA), , line
29 eA1 := crypt(ttppub, [HCA, rA1]), and line 30
(TTP,A, [eA1,′ abort′]) >> Network, A signs, en-
crypts and adds the termination message to the
Network state for TTP .
4 Discussion of Verification Results
Applying a formal method for protocol design is a
self assessment process. Firstly, a set of simplifying
assumptions needs to be found; Secondly, protocol
security goals must be clearly defined for the for-
mal specification and verification; The protocol can
then be formally specified using constraints derived
from simplifying assumptions; Machine verification
can then be performed for protocol analysis. Mali-
cious actions are modelled by gradually relaxing sim-
plifying assumptions to give more power to the at-
tacker. Malicious action modelling can be performed
in many rounds with different levels of difficulties.
Each step of this self assessment process can find
flaws in a protocol. Most of the incompleteness in
the design can be found before modelling malicious
actions. Each step will also give input to refine the
previous steps.
4.1 Protocol Flaws
By examining the security goals we found that the
initial sub-protocol and negotiation sub-protocol did
not generate all the required elements for contractual
evidence verification. The security goals require that
the protocol generates a full set of verifying elements
for checking contractual evidence integrity, {M , L,
SigO, SigR and SigTTP}.
For the initial sub-protocol, the flaw of the proto-
col is that player B does not verify the signature of
node L0 therefore B does not know whether L0 is re-
lated to m0 or other data. A also does not have SigR
from B. The result of this is that A can have two mes-
sages m0 and attack data. m0 is for B to read and
attack data is for applying its signature. B will then
think that it is extending the hash chain related to
m0. In fact, it is extending the hash chain related to
attack data. After a successful protocol run, B signs
a contract with A for attack data. But B has only
obtained A’s SigO of attack data. Therefore it can
not provide evidence that A has made a committment
to message m0.
This proves that the incomplete design can breach
security goal easily, and this type of flaw can be found
in the early stage of self assessment process. The same
attack was also performed on the improved protocol.
No party can successfully complete a protocol run.
Therefore the improved protocol can prevent this dis-
honest action.
4.2 Improved Protocols
From the formal specification we notice that the ini-
tial sub-protocol can be considered as a special situa-
tion (one mini cycle) of the negotiation sub-protocol.
The negotiation sub-protocol has to be executed with
many rounds to complete a contracting process. The
assessment also found that these sub- protocols either
do not generate a full set of verifying elements or miss-
ing verifying procedures. We propose an improved
protocol that merges the initial sub-protocol and the
negotiation sub-protocol into one sub-protocol called
the contracting sub-protocol. Figure 7 shows the im-
proved contracting sub-protocol with the completed
steps that generate full sets of the required verifying
elements.
Our formal specification analysis was performed
on the three sub-protocols (contracting, final stage
and termination) of our improved protocol version.
SHVT generated reachability graphs for scenario
where all players are honest, where only B is dishon-
est and where only A is dishonest.
4.3 Verification on All players are Honest
Scenario
The state reachability graph shows that when all play-
ers are honest, the main group of sub-protocols can
function correctly. Contracting parties had a success-
ful protocol run. Role A and B each obtained a com-
plete set of verifying elements. They also maintained
identical sets of verifying elements for verifying con-
tractual evidence.
Honest Actions Dishonest Actions
1 def trans pattern B offer1 3
2 (M0,M1, L0, L1, rB, eB, ts, bpriv, apub)
3 (B,′ priv′, bpriv)?B Asymkeys,
4 (A,′ pub′, apub)?B Asymkeys,
5 [′start′, A] << B State,
6 [′spec′]?B State,
7 [′offer′] ∼?B State,
8 [A abort] ∼?B State,
9 [M0, L0,′ L n′] << B HashChain,
10 M1 :=′ m1′,
11 [M0, L0] >> B HashChain,
12 ts := [M1, L0],
13 L1 := hash(ts),
14 [M1, L1,′ expects CON ′] >> B HashChain,
15 rB := sign(bpriv, L1),
16 eB := crypt(apub, [M1, rB]),
17 (A,B, [eB,′ offer′]) >> Network,
18 M2 :=′ m2′,
19 ts2 := [M2, L0],
20 L2 := hash(ts2),
21 [M2, L2,′ expects CON ′] >> B HashChain,
22 rB2 := sign(bpriv, L2),
23 eB2 := crypt(apub, [M2, rB2]),
24 (A,B, [eB2,′ offer′]) >> Network,
25 [′expect A cmf ′] >> B State,
26 [′offer′] >> B State;
Table 2: Example code of Player B is Dishonest in def trans pattern B offer1 3
A B
Ln = h(mn‖Ln−1)
σnB = Sig(Ln, PrivB)
Mn = EPubA (mn‖σnB)‖CB
Mn←−
(mn‖σnB) = DPrivA (Mn)
Ln = h(mn‖Ln−1)
if VPubB (σnB , Ln) = 1
σnA = SigPrivA (Ln)
RSPn = EPubB (σnA)‖CA
RSPn−→
if VPubB (σnB , Ln) 6= 1
do not send RSP triggerMn
resend
(σnA) = DPrivB (RSP )
if VPubA (σnA, Ln) = 1
one mini cycle finished
Figure 7: Contracting Stage Sub-Protocol
4.4 Verification on Only B is Dishonest Sce-
nario
The state reachability graph for the only B is dis-
honest scenario shows that an error path has been
generated by B sending two offers to A. However A
did not respond the way that B expected therefore B
can not use the incorrect message after protocol run.
In this graph, it also shows that the correct contract-
ing paths have been performed. The end nodes show
that both A and B have obtained a complete set of
verifying elements and that they are identical.
4.5 Verification on Only A is Dishonest Sce-
nario
In the only A is dishonest scenario, A attempts to
terminate the contracting sub-protocol with B while
maintaining a valid contracting sub-protocol run at
the same time with B. This attempt explores whether
any B signed messages can be substituted. Again the
reachability graph showed some error paths, but no
error path is able to complete the contracting sub-
protocol or termination sub-protocol. A correct con-
tracting path was generated, and both A and B end
nodes again show no security goal has been breached.
The protocol behaved correctly under our three
different set of assumptions.
5 Conclusion
Providing assurance for secure and trusted protocols
or systems should be an essential part of the se-
cure protocol development process. A protocol design
without sufficient specification to clarify the protocol
running environment has become one of the major
barriers to secure protocol implementation.
Using formal methods during protocol design has
proved to be successful in finding protocol flaws. Our
formal analysis also defined a set of assumptions.
These assumptions can then act as guidelines for fur-
ther protocol analysis.
This gradual approach is more suitable for assess-
ing protocol design of complex system.
Future work includes, relaxation more of the as-
sumptions. The complete DFBF protocol specifica-
tion will be performed with simple assumptions to
prevent state explosion during analysis.
Honest Actions Dishonest Actions
1 def trans pattern A offer2 4
2 (M,M0,M1, L0, L1, L1c, Ls1, rA, eA
ts, ts1, ts2, apriv, bpub, rA1, eA1, HCA, ttppub)
3 (A,′ priv′, apriv)?A Asymkeys,
4 (B,′ pub′, bpub)?A Asymkeys,
5 (TTP,′ pub′, ttppub)?A Asymkeys,
6 [′respond′, B] << A State,
7 [′offer′] ∼?A State,
8 M << Network,
9 p(1,M) = A,
10 head(tail(p(3,M))) =′ offer′,
11 [′offer′] >> A State,
12 ts := head(p(3,M)),
13 ts1 := crypt(apriv, ts),
14 M1 := head(ts1),
15 L1 := elem(3, head(tail(ts1))),
16 ts2 := head(tail(ts1)),
17 verify(bpub, ts2) =′ true′,
18 [M0, L0,′ L n′] << A HashChain,
19 [M0, L0] >> A HashChain,
20 Ls1 := [M1, L0],
21 L1c := hash(Ls1),
22 L1 = L1c,
23 [M1, L1,′ L n′] >> A HashChain,
24 rA := sign(apriv, L1),
25 eA := crypt(bpub, [rA]),
26 (B,A, [eA,′ A cfm′]) >> Network,
27 HCA := [L0, L1,′ termination′,′ AB′],
28 rA1 := sign(apriv,HCA),
29 eA1 := crypt(ttppub, [HCA, rA1]),
30 (TTP,A, [eA1,′ abort′]) >> Network,
31 [′respond′, B] >> A State;
Table 3: Example code of Player A is Dishonest in def trans pattern B offer1 4
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